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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ASSOCIATES OF OBSTETRICS and 
FEMALE SURGERY, INC. , a Utah 
corporat ion, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v s . Case No. 13992 
APOLLO PRODUCTIONS, INC. , 
a Utah Corporat ion; GORDON I. 
HYDE and GARY B„ WHETTON, 
individuals, and NATIONAL BANK 
OF NORTH AMERICA, 
Defendants -Appellant s. 
BRIEF Ol" APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND ()'/ CASE 
This is an in ter locutory appeal taken by the: Appellanl NMIIOIM 
i>;ink of North Am<'>"i'•-) nursuant to Rule 7 j •-•r<1n ' 'ah Rules o;" Civ. ' 
' •• ijf.cdure. The .soft: i s sue to be decided . . :>..:. « . ; • • - . • -1 . . 
in '»vii hether S ' •• • •'• oi Title 12 oi Luited States Code applies -o tl 
case and thereby appellant has a right to have this case t r i ed in the 
E a s t e r n Distr ict ol Ni-w \ m I' o !•• •• ; M ' > • fo^ Oi;eens County, 
New York r a the r than in the Distr ict ( .ou r r ••,!' ! ,ake County, Utah. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This action was commenced in the Third Judicial District in and 
for Salt Lake County, Utah by the Plaintiff - Respondent in June of 1972 
to obtain an accounting against Defendants Apollo Productions, Inc. 
Gordon I. Hyde and Gary B. Whetton for defaults on payment of money 
allegedly due Plaintiff under a contract. A claim was contemporaneously 
made against the Defendant - Appellant National Bank of North America 
that it breached an implied fiduciary responsibility. Appellant made a 
Motion to the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint because venue did 
not lie in the forum in which Plaintiff commenced this action. The District 
Court granted the Motion to Dismiss with leave for Plaintiff to amend. 
Plaintiff amended its Complaint and Appellant again filed a Motion to 
Dismiss on the same grounds. After a lengthy continuance of the matter 
and change of counsel, the Court denied the Appellant's Motion. 
A Petition to this Court for an interlocutory appeal was timely 
sought by the Bank. The Petition was granted and this Court ordered 
the Appeal granted as prayed on March 4, 1975. Respondent made a 
Motion to set aside the order granting the interlocutory appeal and such 
Motion was withdrawn on May 2, 1975. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant - National Bank of North America seeks on this 
Appeal, the reversal of the lower Court fs order denying the Bank's Motion 
to Dismiss. Appellant seeks a determination from this Court that venue 
- 9 . -
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for this action does not lie in the Third Judicial District Court of the 
State of Utah, but rather that Appellant has the right to have this case 
tried in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York or 
the Supreme Court of New York, County of Queens. 
IDENTIFICATION OF,THE PARTIES AND 
EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS 
National Bank of North America, Defendant and Appellant, will 
hereinafter be referred to as the Appellant or where appropriate as 
the "Bank". Associates of Obstetrics and Female Surgery, Inc. , a 
Utah corporation, the Plaintiff and Respondent, will hereinafter be 
referred to as the Respondent, or where appropriate by nAssociatesn . 
(R) refers to a page reference in the record of the case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In June of 1972, Respondent commenced this action seeking to 
recover damages arising out of certain loans which Respondent made 
to Defendant, Apollo Productions, Inc. Respondent joined the Bank 
and other parties thereto (R. -213). Service was made on the bank at 
its principal place of business at 44 Wall Street, New York, New York 
on July 5, 1972 (R-204). 
The Bank appeared for the limited purpose of challenging 
jurisdiction of the Utah District Court (R-170). It moved under 12 USC 
94 to dismiss the action as against it asserting that it could not be sued 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County (R-170). In support of this 
Motion, the bank filed an affidavit (R-172), articles of association 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(R-178), and a Memorandum of Law (R-198), which indicate that the 
bank is a national banking association having its principal place of 
business in the Eastern District of New York. 
In opposing that Motion, Respondent alleged that the bank had 
waived its right to assert the protection of said statute, (R-159) and 
based its assertion on a telegram (R-167) sent by the Bank from 
New York to Paul Naisbitt, in Utah stating that if some Acceptable 
third-party" would lend Apollo $50, 000.00 the Bank would lend a like 
amount. The Respondent also asserted the Bank waived its rights under 
12 U.S.C. 94 by asserting a claim in the Bankruptcy proceeding in Utah 
involving Apollo Corporation which is the parent corporation of one of the 
other Defendants. With these assertions before it, the District Court 
granted the Bank's Motion to Dismiss. (R-106) October 11, 1972) 
Subsequently, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint 
(R-104) in which all of the allegations of the original defective Complaint 
were incorporated. The sole difference was that the Plaintiff asserted 
additionally: 
MThat National Bank of North America did enter into 
an agreement with the Plaintiff within the State of Utah, 
took advantage of the laws of the State of Utah in protecting 
its investment in a Utah Corporation, perform certain acts 
within and without the State of Utah in performance of said 
agreement and sought to recover its investment in a Utah 
corporation by prosecuting an involuntary bankruptcy action 
in the Federal District Court for the State of Utah against 
a Utah corporation, and has consequently waived whatever 
privileges it may have had to be sued elsewhere than in 
the State of Utah as to matters arising out of the subject 
matter of said agreement, action, performance and lawsuit.1 ' 
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Responding to the amended Complaint, the Bank appeared again 
for the l imited purpose of filing a Motion to D i smis s challenging the 
jur isdic t ion (R-79). Contemporaneously, the bank filed and served i t s 
memorandum of law (R-85) and affidavits in support of i t s motion (R-81 , 
83), all indicating that the bank i s a national banking associat ion with 
i t s pr inc ipal place of bus iness in New York plus the fact that the bank 
has no branch o r agent in the State of Utah (R-84). Subsequently, the 
motion to d i s m i s s the amended Complaint was denied (R-18) and this 
appeal was taken. 
POINT I 
THE PROVISIONS OF 12 U . S . C . 94 ARE MANDATORY 
IN THAT THEY ONLY ALLOW ACTIONS AGAINST A 
NATIONAL BANK IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WHERE THE BANK IS ESTABLISHED OR A STATE, COUNTY 
OR MUNICIPAL COURT IN THE COUNTY OR CITY 
WHERE THE BANK IS LOCATED 
The Bank i s a nat ional banking associat ion with i ts pr inc ipal p lace 
of bus iness outside Utah. As such, it i s subject to the control and 
regulat ion of Congress . 
It i s well es tabl ished that National Banks a r e Fede ra l i n s t ru -
menta l i t i es and the power of Congress over them is extensive. Indeed, as 
the United States Supreme Court stated in Van Reed v s . PeopleTs National 
Bank, 198 US 554, 557(1905), aff!d 173 N . Y . 314(1904): 
MNational Banks a r e quasi-public inst i tut ions, and 
for the purpose for which they a r e insti tuted a r e national 
in the i r cha rac te r , and, without consti tutional l imi t s , 
a r e subject to the control of Congress and a re not to be 
- 5 -
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interferred with by state legislative or judicial action 
except so far as the lawmaking power of the government 
may permit. " 
Exercising this broad grant of power, Congress has prescribed 
in Title 12, Section 94 of the United States Code, the precise manner 
and circumstances under which litigation may be initiated against 
National Banks. That Section, entitled "Venue of Suits11 provides: 
"Actions and proceedings against any association 
under this chapter may be had in any district or terr i tor ia l 
court of the United States held within the district in which 
such association may be established, or in any state, 
county, or municipal court in the county or city in which 
said association is located having jurisdiction in similar 
cases.11 
As the United States Supreme Court noted in Mercantile 
National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 83 S. Ct. 520, 9 L. Ed. 2d 523 
(1963), this section has consistently been construed to limit suits against 
a national bank to the district in which it maintains its principal place of 
business. In that case, a national bank was sued, along with 143 
other defendants, in the state court in Travis County, Texas. Although 
venue in that county appeared to be proper under local law, the Supreme 
Court, giving full force to the clear te rms of Section 94, held that the 
Bank could be sued only in Dallas County, where its main office was 
located: 
"Appellee, however, would have us hold that any 
state court could entertain a suit against a national 
bank as long as state jurisdictional and venue require-
ments were otherwise satisfied. Such a ruling, or 
course, would render altogether meaningless a 
congressional enactment permitting suit to be brought 
- 6 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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in the bank's home county. This we are unwilling to 
do. . . . 371 U.S. at 560." 
And perhaps even more importantly, after considering whether 
the mandate set forth in Section 94 was either mandatory or permissive 
in nature, the Court emphatically stated: 
"Thus, we find nothing in the statute, i ts history or 
the cases in this Court to support appellee's construction 
of this statute. On the contrary, all these sources convince 
us that the statute must be given a mandatory reading. 371 
U.S. at 562. (Emphasis Added)." 
Likewise, in Buffum v. Chase Nat. Bank, 192 F . 2d 58 (7th Cir . ) , 
cert, denied 342 U.S. 944, 72 S. Ct. 558, 96 L. Ed. 702 (1951), the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit for want of 
proper venue, holding: 
ffA national bank is established within the meaning 
of this act only in the place where i ts principal office and 
place of business is as specified in its organization 
certificate. Leonardi v. Chase National Bank of City of 
New York, 2 Ci r . , 81 F. 2d 19, 22. It was expressly 
held in that case that a suit against such a bank may be 
maintained only in the place of i ts establishment, i. e . , its 
location. There the bank was sued in a district other 
than where it was established. The court said: 'The 
defendant's charter recites that its home office and principal 
place of business is in the Southern District. * * the 
district in which the national bank has its principal place of 
business and which contains the place recited in its charter 
should be taken as the proper district for suits against a 
national bank. The court in the Eastern District of New 
York was without jurisdiction. f 192 F. 2d at 60. " 
It is this interpretation of Section 94 that has been uniformly 
adopted. See, e .g . , Leonardi v. Chase Nat. Bank, 81 F . 2d 19 (2d Cir . ) , 
cert, denied 298 U.S. 677, 56 S. Ct. 941, 80 L. Ed. 1398 (1936); T PO 
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Incorporated v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 325 F . Supp. 663 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); General Electric Credit Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc. , 
271 F. Supp. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Gregor J. Schaefer Sons, Inc., v. 
Watson, 26 A.D. 2d 659, 272N.Y.S. 2d 790 (2d Dep't. , 1966); Blank 
v. Meadow Brook National Bank, 44 M. 2d 448, 254N.Y.S. 2d (Supp. 
Ct. Sullivan County 1964). See also: Michigan National Bank v. Robertson, 
371 U.S. 59, 83 S. Ct. 914, 9 L. Ed. 2d 961 (1963). 
Congress has clearly made its intent manifest in 12 U.S. C. 94. 
The case law overwhelmingly indicates that unless the national banking 
association being sued is established in the state in which the litigation is 
commenced, the action must be dismissed in its entirety for want of 
proper jurisdiction or transferred to the proper forum in which the bank 
is established. 
The evidence in the present case brings the bank within this 
protection. The unrefuted affidavits of the Bank (R-81, 83) indicate 
that the bank is a national banking association with its principal place 
of business in Queen's County New York. The evidence further indicates 
that the bank has not entered into any business transaction in Utah with 
the Plaintiff and that there is no branch or agent in Utah of the Bank 
(R-84). Such facts clearly indicate that the bank is not established in 
Utah and consequently this action may not be maintained against it in 
this state. The courts that could have proper venue in this matter would 
either be the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
or the State Supreme Court for Queen's County, New York. 
- 8 -
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POINT II 
THIS IS NOT A LOCAL ACTION 
There is some authority standing for the proposition that 
although 12 USC 94 prohibits suits against national banking associations 
in forums other than where they are established, if the action is "local" 
as compared to "transitory" the said 12 USC 94 does not apply. Under 
this theory, we assume that Plaintiff will again assert that this is a local 
action and will rely, as it did before, on Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66, 
26 L. Ed. 52 (1880); National Bank of Commerce v. State, 368 F . 2d 
997 (Supp. Ct., Okla.); Lone Star Producing Co. vs. Bird, 406 S.W. 2d 
344 (Ct. Civ. App., Texas, 1966); Fresno National Bank v. Superior Court, 
83 C 1. 491, 24 Pac. 157 (Sup. Ct., Cal. , 1890) and Continental National 
Bank v. Folsom, 78 Ga. 499, 3 S . E . 269 (Supp. Ct., Ga., 1887). However, 
as will be hereafter shown, these so called local actions were either 
an in rem proceeding, affected real estate within the forum state, or were 
based upon local state statutes. A careful analysis of each of these areas 
clearly shows that this action is neither. 
A. NOT AN IN REM PROCEEDING 
That the present action is not a proceeding in rem (local) is best 
illustrated by a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision, Casey v. Adams 
supra. The result in that case turned on the definitions of local and 
transitory actions. A clear definition of local and transitory actions was 
given where Chief Justice Waite said, 
- 9 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"The distinction between local and transitory 
actions is as old as actions themselves, and no one 
has ever supposed that laws which prescribed 
generally where one should be sued, included such 
suits as were local in this character, either by 
statute or the common law unless it was expressly 
so declared. Local actions are in the nature of suits 
in rem, and are to be prosecuted where the thing on 
which they are founded is situated. Id. at 67, 68." 
The Court went on to say, 
nThe proceeding in this case was clearly local in its 
nature. It related to property in the Parish of La Fourche, 
which had been seized and sold under process from the 
district court of that parish. The proceeds of the sale were 
in that court, and could not be distributed until a fconflict 
of privileges' arising between creditors was settled. No 
personal claim was made against the bank. Nothing 
was wanted except to 'class the privilege' of the bank on 
the property seized 'according to its rank. ' Id at 68.?l 
The present action clearly falls outside the perimeters of the 
definition of local or in rem as set forth in Casey. This action is based 
upon an offer to be performed in the State of New York (i. e. the loaning 
of a sum of money) (R-167). There was to be no performance by the 
Bank in Utah. As such, the act cannot conceivably give rise to a 
proceeding in rem in the State of Utah and consequently, such suit should 
only Mbe prosecuted where the thing on which (it is) founded is situated, ! ! 
i. e. in New York. 
B. NOT REAL PROPERTY 
In Lone Star Producing Company v. Bird, supra, Plaintiff brought 
suit to set aside a conveyance of land pursuant to a Texas statute, 
Article 14, Vernon's Ann. Tex. Civ. St. Section 1995(14), which provided 
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that such an action could only be brought in the county where the land 
was situated. The Court held that this was a , flocaln action. In the 
present case, no land is affected that would conceivably convert this 
action to a local proceeding. 
C. NO LOCAL STATUTE 
In National Bank of Commerce v. State, supra, an action was brought 
pursuant to an Oklahoma statute to recover penalties from the Bank., 
The enabling statute, 18 0 . S , 1941 Section 88 (f), read: 
nIn the event that any penalty to which any corporation 
is subject is not collected within thirty (30) days from the 
date of notification as aforesaid, the County Attorney 
shall institute an action in the name of the State of Oklahoma 
in the District Court of the county in which the real 
estate illegally held is located for the recovery of said 
penalties. n 
The Court held, at 368, F. 2d 1000: 
nIn our opinion, the effect of the referred-to 
statutory provision is to make an action such as the one 
before us a !local action. ! In 1 C. J. S. 'Actions' 
Section la (14), P. 946 a local action must be brought 
in a particular place or county. ' The Supreme Court 
of Main said in Burtchell v. Willey, 147 Maine 339, 
87 A. 2d 658, 661, that 'where the statute prescribes the 
County in which a particular * * * action shall be 
brought, the action is local. ' 
Similarly, the Court, in Fresno National Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 
stated that the local actions are in rem actions or those based on statute. 
The same conclusion was reached by the Court in Continental National 
Bank v. Falsom, supra. 
Plaintiffs in the present action have not previously, nor are they 
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able to now point to any local s ta tutes that could qualify the action as local 
in na tu re . F u r t h e r m o r e , the re i s none. 
POINT III 
THE BANK HAS NOT WAIVED ITS RIGHTS UNDER 
12 U . S . C . 94 
Respondent fa i rs no be t t e r in a s se r t i ng that the Bank has waived 
i t s pr ivi lege to a s s e r t the b a r to th is suit in this Court under 12 U.S . C. 94. 
Respondent has previously a s s e r t e d that the Bank has waived the 
r ights it might o therwise have under 12 U. S. C. 94. In support of th i s , 
Plaintiff has cited Lichtenfels, v s . North Carol ina National Bank, 260 N. C. 
146, 132 S.E, 2d 360 (Supp. C t . , N . C . , 1963). In that case , the bank was 
being sued as a t e s t amen ta ry t r u s t e e of an es ta te , not in i t s capacity to 
engage in the bus iness of banking. The Court held that by accepting the 
duties of a t r u s t ee , the bank had waived the protect ion of 12 U. S. C. 94. 
However, it should be noted h e r e , as the Court did, that the state statute, 
G .S . Section 1-78, specifically provided that a suit against a fiduciary had 
to be brought in the county in which the fiduciary qualified. That situation 
does not obtain h e r e . 
In Gregor J . Schaefer & Sons, Inc. v. Watson, A . D . 2d 659, 
272 N . Y . S . 2d 790 (2nd Dep ' t . , 1966), another case that allegedly supports 
Plaintiff1 s position, the bank had i t s main office in Nassau County, New 
York but had fifteen b ranch offices in Suffolk County, New York . The 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York held that 
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the existence of these branches did not constitute a waiver of the 
privilege to be sued only in Nassau County. Rather, the Court ordered 
a hearing to determine whether that bank held itself out to be engaged 
in the general business of banking in Suffolk County, whether its 
charter so provided or whether it had filed any documents with Federal 
or State authorities indicating its amenability to suit in Suffolk County. 
Indeed, this was the precise situation in Frankford Supply Co. 
v. Matteo, 305 F . Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa . , 1969). That case involved 
whether the First Camden National Bank and Trust Company of Camden, 
New Jersey had waived its right to be sued in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
The Court found such waiver but only on the following facts: 
"It is agreed here that as in that case the Philadelphia 
branch of First Camden is a 'full service bank1 offering 
the full range of banking services that are offered at all 
of its New Jersey branches; that it competes with 
other Philadelphia customers; that deposits in any office 
of the bank can be withdrawn at any other office, no matter 
where the records are kept; up to date in all offices via 
computer. We therefore think that First Camden has mani-
fested an intent to be found in Philadelphia, they are 
attachable by service of a writ on the First Camden 
Philadelphia Bank. 
Security Mills of Ashvill, Inc. vs . Wachvia Bank & Trust Co. 
185 S.E. 2d 58 (7th Cir . , 1951) held only that a national bank can be 
sued in the county where it maintains a branch office. In Michigan 
National Bank v. Superior Court of Contra Costa, 99 Cal. 823, 23 Cal. 
App. 3rd 1 (Ct. App. 1972), the Court held that where a Michigan bank 
made a loan to a person in California, secured by a mortgage filed in 
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California and thereafter foreclosed its mortgage in a state court 
in California, the borrower could sue the bank in California, Again, 
no such acts by the Bank in the present action can be pointed to as 
constituting a waiver. 
In Buffum vs . Chase National Bank of the City of New York, 192 
F. 2d 58 (7th Cir . , 1951) cert, denied, 342, U.S. 944 (1951), the Court 
did not find a waiver of the privilege. There, the Bank had been 
authorized by the Secretary of State of Illinois to conduct a trust 
business in Illinois, it had an office, officers and a telephone in Illinois 
and had consented to suit in Illinois on its trust business. Nonetheless, 
because that action did not involve any aspect of the Bank's trust activities, 
the Court held that no waiver could be found. 
The case of Rome v. Eltra Corporation 297 F. Supp. 314, is also 
in point. There the Court held that the national bank did not waive its 
right under 12 U.S. C. 94 where it merely assumed the duties of indenture 
trustee under the Trust Indenture Act. The case clearly indicates the 
party asserting waiver of 12 U. S. C. 94 has a heavy burden of proof. 
As must be evident, the Bank does not meet any of the criteria 
of the cases cited where a waiver was found. That is, it does not maintain 
a branch in Utah, it does not hold itself out to the residents in Utah as 
offering banking services, it is not authorized to do business in Utah and 
consequently it need not, nor has it filed a designation with the Secretary 
of State of Utah authorizing him to accept service of process (R-83, 84). 
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Nor as to the Respondent is there any evidence that indicates the Bank 
has loaned money to it, received or requested a mortgage from it or 
utilized the laws of the State of Utah to its benefit with regard to Plaintiff 
that would otherwise subject the Bank to jurisdiction in Utah as was found 
in the above cited cases. 
The Plaintiff can only point to one act of the Bank within the State 
of Utah and that is the participation of the Bankruptcy proceedings of 
Apollo Corporation. However, that proceeding was in the United States 
District Court for this District of Utah, involving Federal law and 
involved Apollo Corporation, a separate and distinct corporation from 
Apollo Productions, Inc., (R-144) one of the Defendants herein. And, 
as Plaintiff has previously admitted, this single act gives r ise to no right 
to this Plaintiff. This minimal proof presented by the Plaintiff does not 
meet the heavy burden of proof re quired to show that a waiver has been 
committed. 
Furthermore, the Bank has timely raised the issue of jurisdiction. 
Each time the Bank has appeared before the District Court, it has done 
so for the limited purpose of challenging jurisdiction (R-170, 79). It has 
not taken advantage of Utah courts by making a general appearance, but 
only asserted its right to be sued in a forum which is congressionally 
mandated. In this respect, as well as others, the Bank has not waived the 
protection of 12 U.S.C. 94. 
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POINT IV 
ACTION COMMENCED AGAINST THE APPELLANT 
HEREIN IN JURISDICTION OTHER THAN WHERE 
THE APPELLANT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED HAVE 
BEEN DISMISSED OR TRANSFERRED 
T h e r e can be no doubt that the Appellant here in , i s a National 
Banking Associat ion within the meaning of Section 94 of T i t l e 12 of the 
United States Code (R-81 , 82) and thus may be subjected to suit only 
in the United States Dis t r ic t Court for the E a s t e r n Dis t r ic t of New York 
o r the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Queens. 
Thus , an action commenced against the Bank in the United States 
Dis t r ic t Court for the middle Dis t r ic t of F lor ida was t r ans f e r r ed to the 
E a s t e r n Dis t r ic t of New York upon a Motion to T rans fe r , Action Realty 
Inc. v. National Bank of North Amer ica , 70-248-ORL-CIV. A s imi l a r resul t 
was reached in a lawsuit commenced in the United States Dis t r ic t Court 
of the E a s t e r n Dis t r ic t of Louisiana, Gulf South Realty Corp . v. National 
Bank of North Amer i ca 67-1856. Indeed in a recent decision by the 
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kanaje Corporat ion v. National 
Bank of North Amer ica , Index No. 2300-71 (Supp. C t . , Rockland County 
June 30, 1971), Jus t i ce Si lverman granted a Motion predicated upon 
12 U. S. C. 94 and held that this Bank could be sued only in Queen fs 
County: 
d e f e n d a n t ' s Motion to change the place of t r i a l on 
this dec la ra to ry judgment action from Rockland County 
to Queen 's County, upon the grounds that Rockland County 
i s not a p rope r County (CPLR 510 i s granted) U . S . Code, 
T i t l e 12, Section 94; Gregor J . Schaefer & Sons, I n c . , 
v. Watson, 26 A . D . 2d 659, and ca se s cited there in) . 
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To the same effect is Wiener v, the Real Estate Fund of American Ltd,, 
National Bank of North America et. al. 71 CIV 3011 (S0D0N0Y0 1971). 
CONCLUSION 
Congress has been clear in the mandate in Section 12 U.S. C. 94. 
Associates ask the Court to ignore the plain language of this code provision 
that has been consistently construed by the Courts in this country. 
The present claim of associates does not come within any of 
the exceptions to that statute. Stripped to essentials, Associates claim 
that the Bank should be sueable in Utah because it sent a telegram (R-167) 
from New York to Utah addressed to Dr. Paul Naisbitt who is not even 
a party to this action. The Bank has previously litigated very similar 
issues elsewhere and each time the appropriate court has recognized 
that 12 U.S.C. 94 controls jurisdiction. 
The District Court order denying the dismissal of the Plaintiff's 
Complaint was erroneous. Venue in this suit does not lie in the Third 
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah. The Bank maintains its 
principal place of business in Queen's County and in compliance with the 
Federal Statute, it is in the United States District Court of the Eastern 
District of New York orthe Supreme Court of the State of New York County 
of Queen's, that Plaintiff must press its claim. The Bank has properly 
and timely raised this issue and it is respectfully submitted that this 
Court should reverse the lower court 's order denying the Bank's Motion 
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to Di smiss for improper venue. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, McMURRAY & THURMAN 
By -rf&tJL&U 
B a r r i e G. McKay 7 / 
At torneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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